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Abstract: In the case of Pazzalo v. Rhode Island the United States Supreme Court 
reversed a determination by the Rhode Island Supreme Court which held that land 
owners had no right to sue for a regulatory taking if the land owners purchased title to 
land on which a preexisting restriction existed.  Before this case, the rule in New York 
also precluded landowners from challenging land use regulations that existed at the 
time they purchased land.  After holding that a regulatory takings challenge existed, the 
Supreme Court remanded the case back to Rhode Island to decide whether the 
preexisting regulations affected the plaintiff’s investment-backed expectations.  This 




The New York Court of Appeals has held that, when an individual purchases 
property that is subject to land use regulations that affect its value, the purchaser may 
not challenge the regulation as a taking of its property rights. Such a regulation, the 
court says, forms part of the title to the property as a preexisting rule of state law.  While 
the title to the regulated parcel may be conveyed by the landowner, the purchaser’s title 
is necessarily limited to the rights to use the property under the law at the time of the 
purchase.   
 
The New York position on this point is different from that adopted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  On June 28, 2001, the Supreme Court held that a blanket rule that 
purchasers who take title with notice of an adopted land use regulation have no right to 
compensation “is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for what 
is taken.”  The Court held that a pre-existing regulation affecting a parcel is not 
necessarily inherent in the title taken by a purchaser or heir and cannot be used as a 
per se device to deny the right to compensation.  In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 2001 
WL 721005, the Court reversed a determination by the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
that a landowner had no right to challenge a regulation as a regulatory taking when the 
regulation was in place when title to the land was acquired. The Court first held that 
Palazzolo’s case was ripe for adjudication after having submitted an application for a 
permit to fill tidal wetlands for development as a private beach club.  
 
Palazzolo owned a 20 acre parcel, most of which was salt marsh subject to tidal 
flooding.  Development would have required significant fill, up to six feet in some places, 
to support any development.  Under the Rhode Island coastal wetland regulations, 
development on the tidal wetlands portion of this site was prohibited unless the owner 
secured a special exception permit for an activity that serves a compelling public 
purpose which benefits the public as a whole.  Since the responsible state agency, in 
denying Palazzolo’s application to fill 11 of 18 tidal wetland acres for a private beach 
club, made a determination that this type of private development of tidal lands was not 
eligible for a special use permit, the Court held that the matter was ripe.  In this unusual 
context, no further applications by Palazzolo were necessary to determine how the land 
could be developed privately under the regulations.  An application for a permit to fill 
fewer acres would not change the determination that the requisite “public interest” was 
being served.  This constituted a final determination that there can be no filling of this 
class of wetlands for any ordinary land use and, therefore, the case was ripe for judicial 
review.   
 
The Palazzolo case does not appear to alter or affect the law regarding the 
ripeness of cases that challenge land use regulations.  In Williamson County Regional 
Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the Court 
ruled that a landowner must wait until the governmental agency responsible for 
implementing land use regulations has reached a final decision regarding the 
application of the regulations to the affected property. This has created some confusion 
as to how many applications, and for what intensity of use, a landowner must submit 
before it can be determined by the courts whether the regulation has gone far enough to 
constitute a taking.  The Palazzolo decision leaves undisturbed the understanding that 
the landowner must submit applications for development activity sufficient to discover 
the permissible uses with a reasonable degree of certainty.  It is not sufficient to submit, 
for example, a grandiose development proposal, obtain a denial, and then challenge the 
regulations as a regulatory taking. In the ordinary context, land use agencies have a 
high degree of discretion to soften the strictures of the regulations they administer. It 
remains the law that the landowner must submit applications that give the agency the 
opportunity to decide and explain the reach of a challenged regulation.  Blanket 
prohibitions of private development activity of the type involved in the Rhode Island 
coastal wetlands regulations are not found in most land use regimes.   
 
The ripeness issue bears on the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Palazzolo 
regarding the effect of a preexisting regulation on the existence of a takings claim.  The 
Court stated that it would be illogical and unfair to bar a regulatory takings claim 
because of the transfer of land after a regulation was adopted where the steps 
necessary to make the claim ripe were not taken by the previous owner.  Here, 
Palazzolo’s claim ripened after applications were submitted and denied, became ripe at 
that moment, and accrued to his benefit as owner.  
 
The New York rule affected by the Palazzolo decision was articulated in four 
cases decided on the same day in 1997.  In Gazza v. DEC, 89 N.Y.2d 603, 679 N.E.2d 
1035, 657 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1997) the landowner challenged the denial of a variance from 
a set back requirement which prevented any economical use on the affected parcel, a 
one acre lot .  The landowner purchased the parcel for $100,000 knowing it was subject 
to wetland regulations from which a variance from the State Department of 
Environmental Conservation (DEC) would have to be obtained to allow its development 
as a single-family parcel. The landowner estimated that, if the variances were granted, 
the land would be worth $396,000.  Because the owner could not demonstrate that the 
variances would have no adverse impact on the tidal wetlands contained on the 
property, the request was denied.  The effect of the denial was to limit the use of the site 
to a catwalk, dock, and parking lot, activities which would have required variances from 
the village’s zoning board.  Rather than pursue these local variances, the landowner 
challenged the denials as a regulatory taking.  The court noted that “[o]ur courts have 
long recognized that a property interest must exist before it may be taken.”  A taking 
claim may not “be based upon property rights that have already been taken away from a 
landowner in favor of the public.”  “[R]egulatory limitations that inhere in the title itself 
will bind a purchaser (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 
(1992).”   
 
In Anello v. ZBA, 89 N.Y.2d 535, 678 N.E.2d 870, 656 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1997), the 
Court of Appeals denied a takings claim where the village’s steep slope law prevented 
an owner who purchased a lot after the law was adopted from building a single-family 
house on her lot.  In Kim v. City of New York, 90 N.Y.2d 1, 681 N.E.2d 312, 659 
N.Y.S.2d 145 (1997), no taking was found where the landowner had constructive notice 
when he bought the land of a City Charter provision allowing the City to enter the site 
and place fill on it to provide lateral support for the elevation of a public road that was 
below legal grade. In Basile v. Town of Southhampton, 89 N.Y.2d 974, 678 N.E.2d 489, 
655 N.Y.S. 2d 877 (1997), the court denied landowner’s claim that the value of its land 
taken in condemnation proceedings should be valued as if wetland regulations did not 
apply to the site.  The court held that wetland regulations “do not effect a taking when a 
purchaser acquires property subject to such regulations.” 
 
A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Palazzolo could not agree on whether 
the existence of a regulation at the time of purchase should be considered in 
determining whether the regulation interferes with the purchaser’s investment-backed 
expectations, one of several factors used to determine if a taking has occurred.  The 
Supreme Court remanded the case to the Rhode Island courts for a determination as to 
whether a taking had in fact occurred.  In making its determination, the state court will 
have to consider the debate of two concurring justices in the Palazzolo decision.  In her 
concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor noted that “Today’s holding does not mean that 
the timing of the regulation’s enactment relative to the acquisition of title is 
immaterial….”  She cited Penn Central Transp. Co. V. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978) for the proposition that several factors are considered in determining whether a 
regulation constitutes a taking, including whether it interferes with the landowner’s 
legitimate investment-backed expectations. She noted that “the regulatory regime in 
place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the 
reasonableness of those expectations.” 
 
Justice Scalia disagreed in a separate concurring opinion. In his view, “the fact 
that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title … should have no bearing 
upon the determination of whether the restriction is so substantial as to constitute a 
taking.”  He added that the investment-backed expectations “do not include the 
assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives property of so much of its value as 
to be unconstitutional.” 
 
The issue of most importance to regulators and landowners, of course, is the 
Court’s position on the substantive matter of what constitutes a regulatory taking.  On 
this point, the Palazzolo case makes little progress. Palazzolo’s property contained two 
upland acres and it was agreed that a substantial residence could be built on that land. 
The Supreme Court upheld the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s determination that the 
coastal regulations did not constitute a total taking under Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Palazzolo submitted evidence that the land was 
appraised at $3,150,000 under a 74-lot subdivision proposal he had submitted for 
approval before his private beach club application.  The parties agreed that the upland 
acres had a value of $200,000 for residential development.  The Court noted that the 
development rights on the upland area did not constitute a token interest and that, 
therefore, the regulations did not leave the land economically idle as must be the case 
for the Lucas total taking rule to apply.   
 
The U. S. Supreme Court also refused to consider Palazzolo’s claim that the 
relevant parcel to use in a takings case is the land affected by the regulation, in this 
case the 18 wetland acres.  The majority decision recognized that what parcel of land 
should be considered when a takings claim is raised is the “persisting question of what 
is the proper denominator in the takings fraction.”  Since this issue was not presented in 
the petition for certiorari to the Court, the majority refused to consider it.  
 
On remand, the Rhode Island courts will make their determination as to whether 
Palazzolo’s investment-backed expectations were interfered with, while considering the 
importance of a preexisting regulation in shaping those expectations. 
